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AN ANTITRUST ARGUMENT: WHETHER A FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION ORDER IS WITHIN THE AMBIT OF THE
CLAYTON ACT'S SECTION 5
Norman E. Matteoni*
Big money makes substantial law out of what may have appeared to be
small questions. This Parkinson-type principle is particularly applicable to
private enforcement of the antitrust laws. Any competitor or customer, whose
business or other property is injured by a violation of the antitrust laws, may
"recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including
a reasonable attorney's fees."' The multiplication of big money by three draws
into issue all manner and maneuver of the private antitrust suit.
During the past few years, for example, extensive legal battle2 has been
waged over the interpretation of section 5 of the Clayton Act.' The primary
intent of that section is to make the private litigant's weapon more effective:
subsection (a) grants a plaintiff the use of a final judgment, entered against
the defendant in a prior government suit, as prima facie evidence of antitrust
transgression; and subsection (b) suspends the running of a four-year statute
of limitations while the government action is pending and provides one year
after its conclusion for the plaintiff to initiate his cause of action.4 A portion
of the controversy surrounding this statute questions the status of a Federal
Trade Commission's antitrust cease and desist order: Can such a proceeding
constitute prima facie evidence of antitrust violation, and/or can it toll the
statute of limitations for the private suitor?
In 1923, the answer was clearly "no." New York Federal District Judge
Edwin L. Garvin declared in the genesis case of Proper v. John Bene & Sons:'
* B.A., University of Santa Clara; LL.B., University of Notre Dame; Member of the
California Bar; Deputy County Counsel, Santa Clara County, California.
1 Clayton Act § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
2 For one phase of the battle, see Matteoni, Antitrust Ambiguity Under Section 5(a)
of the Clayton Act, 11 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 792 (1964).
3 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1958).
4 Section 5 states in full:
(a) A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter rendered in any
civil or criminal proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States
under the antitrust laws to the effect that a defendant has violated said
laws shall be prima facie evidence against such defendant in any action or
proceeding brought by any other party against such defendant under said
laws or by the United States under 4a of this title, as to all matters
respecting which said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between
the parties thereto: Provided, That this section shall not apply to consent
judgments or decrees entered before any testimony has been taken or to
judgments or decrees entered in actions under section 4a of this title.
(b) Whenever any civil or criminal proceeding is instituted by the
United States to prevent, restrain, or punish violations of any of the anti-
trust laws, but not including an action under 4a of this title, the running
of the statute of limitations in respect of every private right of action arising
under said laws and based in whole or in part on any matter complained of in
said proceeding shall be suspended during the pendency thereof and for one
year thereafter: Provided, however, That whenever the running of the
statute of limitations in respect of a cause of action arising under section
4 of this title is suspended hereunder, any action to enforce such cause of
action shall be forever barred unless commenced either within the period
of suspension or within four years after the cause of action accrued.
5 295 Fed. 729 (E.D.N.Y. 1923).
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An analysis of section 5 ... discloses that there are six require-
ments in said section 5 with which compliance must be had in
order to make the proceedings competent evidence in this suit:
(1) The judgment or decree must be final. (2) It must have been
rendered in a criminal prosecution or in a suit or proceeding in
equity. (3) The prosecution, suit, or proceeding must have been
brought by or on behalf of the United States. (4) It must have
been instituted under the anti-trust laws. (5) It must be to the
effect that a defendant has violated those laws. (6) It shall be
prima facie evidence against that defendant.
Considering these in the order set forth, the court is constrained
to hold: (1) That the proceedings before the Federal Trade Com-
mission did not result in a final judgment or decree. (2) There
is grave doubt whether the proceedings [sic] before the Commission
is a proceeding in equity. The Commission itself is rather an
investigating body than a judicial tribunal, and its order has no
binding effect until it has received the judicial sanction of the
Circuit Court of Appeals. (3) Strictly speaking, it would seem that
the proceeding is not brought by or on behalf of the United States,
inasmuch as it is instituted by the Federal Trade Commission, al-
though it may well be held that this body as a creature of the
government may be said to be acting on behalf thereof. (4) The
suit or proceeding must be brought under the anti-trust laws.
Neither the Federal Trade Commission Act in its references to anti-
trust acts, nor the Clayton Act in its references to anti-trust laws,
includes the Federal Trade Commission Act in such a classification.
... (5) The discussion of the fourth requirement is applicable to
the fifth. (6) The Act permits the proceedings before the Commis-
sion to be received as prima facie evidence against such defendant.
In the case at bar there are various other defendants. 6
Today that reasoning has been challenged.
THE LEGISLATIVE Am FACTUAL CONTEXT
The Federal Trade Commission has been assigned a secondary role' in
antitrust enforcement, while the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department,
of course, has the primary role.3 Under its own enabling act, the Commission
is given the broad power to prevent "unfair methods of competition in com-
merce."9 But the real trust-busting strength of the FTC is provided by the
Clayton Act. That act1 establishes a concurrent enforcement scheme by the
agency and the Justice Department to prohibit: (1) discrimination in price,
services or facilities between different purchasers of commodities of like grade
and quality; payment or receipt of commissions, brokerage or discount, in lieu
thereof, for anything other than services rendered in the sale or purchase of
6 Id. at 731-32. (Emphasis added).
7 Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51
(1958) as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(f) (Supp. V, 1964); Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 734 (1914),
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (Supp. II, 1964).
8 Sherman Antitrust Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (1958);
Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1958), as amended, 15
U.S.C. §§ 13, 21 (Supp. V, 1964).
9 Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1958).
10 Clayton Act § 11, 38 Stat. 734 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (Supp. V, 1964).
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merchandise;" (2) exclusive dealing leases, sales or contracts; 2 (3) the merger,
consolidation or acquisition of corporations where, in any line of commerce,
the effect may be either substantially to lessen competition or to tend towards
monopolization;" and (4) interlocking directorates among corporations, one of
which has capital aggregating more than one million dollars. In these four
areas of twin Clayton Act jurisdiction, the Commission is competent to act
independently of the Department. To prevent duplication of effort, however,
each "clears proposed investigation with the other before proceeding.""
Although these powers have always resided with the FTC, there have
been some statutory changes since the Proper case which merit attention. First,
the dual enforcement of the above provisions was made more efficient by a 1950
amendment to section 11 which gave the Attorney General the right to inter-
vene in a Clayton Act proceeding by the Commission." Second, Congress in
1959 adopted what is termed the Finality Act,' modifying this same section.
Formerly, the FTC had to seek execution of its order by application to the
Court of Appeals, if its command to cease antitrust violation was ignored. It
had no enforcement power of its own.- But now such a follow-up is unnecessary;
the Commission's antitrust order becomes final upon the expiration of the sixty
days during which defendant may seek review." Incidentally, the FTC's own Act
had been amended several years earlier to provide that a cease and desist order
shall become final "upon the expiration of the time allowed for filing a petition
for review, if no such petition has been duly filed within such time."' " The
Finality Act bestowed the same status on the Commission's Clayton Act orders
as orders under its own Act had enjoyed since 1938.
There also has been modification of the Clayton Act's section 5. As enacted
in 1914, it read in pertinent part:
A final judgment or decree hereafter rendered in any criminal
prosecution or in any suit or proceeding in equity brought by or on
behalf of the United States under the antitrust laws to the effect
that a defendant has violated said laws shall be prima facie evi-
dence against such defendant in any suit or proceeding brought
by any other party against such defendant under said laws as
to all matters respecting which said judgment or decree would
be an estoppel as between the parties thereto: Provided, This sec-
tion shall not apply to consent judgments or decrees entered before
any testimony has been taken....
Whenever any suit or proceeding in equity or criminal prose-
cution is instituted by the United States to prevent, restrain, or
punish violations of any of the antitrust laws, the running of the
statute of limitations in respect of each and every private right
11 Clayton Act § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (Supp. V, 1964).
12 Clayton Act § 3, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958).
13 Clayton Act § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
14 Clayton Act § 8, 38 Stat. 732 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1958).
15 2 TRADE REG. REP. 1 8550.
16 64 Stat. 1126 (1950), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (Supp. V, 1964).
17 73 Stat. 243 (1959), 15 U.S.C. § 21 (Supp. V, 1964).
18 Clayton Act § 11(g), 73 Stat 243 (1959), 15 U.S.C. § 21 (Supp. V, 1964), provides:
"Any order issued under subsection (b) shall become final - (1) upon the expiration of
the time allowed for filing a petition for review, if no such petition has been duly fied within
such time .... *
19 52 Stat. 113 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(g) (1958).
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of action arising under said laws and based in whole or in part on
any matter complained of in said suit or proceeding shall be
suspended during the pendency thereof.20
A 1955 amendment,2' however, effected some interesting changes. Although
the wording "judgment or decree" remains, the italicized phrases calling for a
criminal prosecution or a proceeding in equity no longer do. Substituted are
the words "civil or criminal proceeding." This would not seem to make a dif-
ference; nonetheless, an argument is made over the modification. 2
The discussion which follows debates the major points upon which Proper
relied to deny the inclusion of an FTC cease and desist order under section 5.
The dispute is given voice through several recent cases: for exclusion stand the
opinions of Farmington Dowel Products Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co.,23 and Volasco
Products Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co.,2  both federal district court decisions,
and the Eighth Circuit's Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co.;2 5 the
Third Circuit, in the unanimous decision of N. J. Wood Finishing Co. v. Minn.
Mining & Mfg. Co.,28 has taken a position for inclusion. The latter opinion,
which is also the most recent on the subject, ambitiously sets forth the conclu-
sion that statutory amendments to the Clayton Act have caused the demise of
the grandfather Proper case.
Before going any further, it may be helpful to posit a hypothetical factual
situation in order to take the argument out of the abstract. The typical cast of
characters is as follows: the treble-damage Plaintiff is a producer and supplier
of a raw material which is utilized by Defendant One, the leading manufacturer
in its field. In mid-1959, Defendant One acquired Defendant Two, a competitor
of Plaintiff; a few months later it further acquired Defendant Three, a small
company making the same product as Defendant One. A concurrent result of
this vertical and horizontal integration of manufacturers and supplier was the
exclusion of producers, including Plaintiff, from a large portion of their former
markets. The FTC, observing this activity, issued a complaint against the de-
fendants in August, 1961, alleging that these acquisitions substantially lessened
competition and tended to create a monopoly, as proscribed by section 7 of
the Clayton Act. (Note that there can be no question whether the Federal Trade
Commission Act is an antitrust law, because here the agency quite obviously
asserts antitrust disobedience under the Clayton Act.) The matter was heard
by an FTC hearing examiner and appealed to the Board of Commissioners
which entered a final order in June, 1963, commanding, inter alia, Defendant
One to divest itself of all assets of Defendants Two and Three.
Finally, in January, 1964, Plaintiff filed its treble-damage action, alleging
violations, to its detriment, of the antitrust laws by Defendants One, Two and
Three. The Defendants did not answer but immediately moved to dismiss the
complaint on the grounds that over four years had transpired since the cause
of action arose and therefore the statute of limitations had raised its bar; or,
20 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (emphasis added) (now 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1958)).
21 69 Stat. 283 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1958).
22 See text accompanying notes 35-38, infra.
23 223 F. Supp. 967 (D. Me. 1963).
24 223 F. Supp. 712 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
25 327 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1964).
26 332 F.2d 346 (3d Cir. 1964).
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in the alternative, they sought to strike all references to proceedings before the
Federal Trade Commission which appeared in the complaint. The complaining
party vigorously opposed the main thrust of the attack, arguing that the statute
was suspended under section 5 (b) of the Clayton Act by the agency suit; more-
over, hoping for success on that point, Plaintiff attempted to show that a con-
tested FTC order constituted prima facie evidence of antitrust offenses under
section 5 (a).
Thus the stage for the debate is set.
THE JUDGMENT OR DECREE MUST BE FINAL
For a brief period during 1945, the Second Circuit did indeed adopt the
position that an FTC order in a Clayton Act case was prima facie evidence
of a violation of the antitrust laws. The majority in Brunswick-Balke-Collender
Co. v. American Billiard & Bowling Corp." initially had reasoned that the
1938 amendment to the Federal Trade Commission Act, making its orders final
unless there is appeal to a Circuit Court within 60 days, gave the Commission's
order the status of a final judgment or decree under section 5. Judge Evans
dissented, pointing out that despite the finality of an FTC order it was not the
kind of judgment or decree contemplated by the section. Upon rehearing,"
however, the majority's opinion was withdrawn. The court quite properly
realized that the 1938 amendment did not affect the Commission's orders under
the Clayton Act since it had reference only to the Federal Trade Commission
Act.
It is urged today that the majority's reasoning in the initial decision of
Brunswick-Balke has been reinstated by the Finality Act of 1959, an express
amendment to the Clayton Act. Further, Justice Brennan gave the Supreme
Court's recognition to the finality of a Commission antitrust cease and desist
order when he said: "The severity of possible penalties prescribed by the amend-
ments for violations of orders which have become final underlies the necessity
for fashioning orders which are, at the outset, sufficiently clear and precise to
avoid raising serious questions as to their meaning and application."2
But the attorneys for Reynolds Metals in their argument for exclusion in
Highland Supply sought to place the matter in a different perspective, urging
that the 1959 Finality Act modified only section 11 of the Clayton Act and
did not affect the relevant requirements of section 5. Senator Sparkman's
remark was cited to demonstrate that the legislative history sustained
their position: "'Let me emphasize that the bill before us today proposes
no new departure. Nothing new is sought to be injected into our well-established
and proven concept of intelligent, effective enforcement procedures ... ' ""
The significance of that quote lies in its deletion. The Senator further stated:
27 150 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 757 (1945).
28 Id. at 74.
29 FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 368 U.S. 360, 367-68 (1962). (Emphasis added). The
penalties of which Justice Brennan speaks are the civil penalties of not more than $5,000
for each separate violation of an FTC final order, as set forth in section 11(1) of the Clayton
Act.
30 Brief for Appellee, p. 22, footnote, Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co.,
327 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1964).
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The bill attempts to confer no authority that is in anywise different
from authority long exercised by the Federal Trade Commission
under the provisions of the Wheeler-Lea Act. In fact, the bill pro-'
poses to confer upon the Federal Trade Commission, insofar as
Clayton Act violations are concerned, precisely-and in almost
exactly the same language-the enforcement authority and pro-
cedures which Congress conferred and prescribed with respect to
the Federal Trade Commission Act as amended by the Wheeler-
Lea Act.
The 'bill before us today can, in truth, be called a perfecting
amendment to the Clayton Act. It has no other purpose than to
effectuate the will of Congress with respect to the role of the Federal
Trade Commission in Clayton Act enforcement ...1
If the 1959 amendment were intended to give an FTC order under the Clayton
Act the same status that it held under its own act, it then seems that the
original conclusion in Brunswick-Balke would now be vindicated. Moreover,
if the amendment were intended to perfect the Clayton Act, it is unlikely that
section 5 would have been insulated from such perfection.
Prior to the Finality Act, enforcement of an FTC order under the Clayton
Act followed an arduous path. The initial effort by the agency amounted to
little more than investigating and noting breaches of the antitrust law. If the
FTC later suspected a disregard of its cease and desist order, it was required
to make that determination by formal hearing and then apply to a federal court
of appeals for execution of its order. The court, in turn, not only had to resolve
the legality of the order, but further had to decide whether the facts found by
the FTC constituted a violation of the Act.
No longer does the agency's cease and desist command simply stand as
notice of antitrust disobedience, having "no effect in itself, unless made opera-
tive by the Circuit Court of Appeals... ."" Rather, the order now constitutes
complete relief - an injunctive measure - in and of itself.
It should be noted that subsection 5(b) omits the "final judgment or
decree" language of 5(a), and states that the statute of limitations is suspended
upon institution of a "civil or criminal proceeding." It does not require that a
private party stand in anticipation of a final order before the statute is tolled.
If it did, courts such as the one in N. J. Wood, faced with the question whether
an FTC consent order can toll the statute of limitations in a treble-damage case,
could easily dispose of the issue with a finding that a consent order is not a final
judgment, since by agreeing to a consent order the defendant does not admit a
violation of the antitrust laws but merely agrees to discontinue the challenged
activity.
Conceding for the moment that the Finality Act provides the answer to
the first requirement of Proper, it is asserted that it did not make an FTC pro-
ceeding a "civil proceeding," nor did it make the FTC "the United States."
WHAT IS A CIVIL PROCEEDING?
It is readily apparent that the Commission's action is not a criminal pro-
ceeding, for the agency has the power neither to imprison nor to fine. Those
31 105 CONG. REc. 4465-66 (1959) (Emphasis added).
32 Proper v. John Bene & Sons, 295 Fed. 729, 731 (E.D.N.Y. 1923)..
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urging exclusion of these proceedings from section 5 claim that it is equally
obvious that they are not civil in nature. In Highland Supply, District Judge
Meredith declared: "[I]n our view 'civil or criminal proceeding' plainly means
a judicial proceeding and not an administrative proceeding."3 This is clear
because the words "civil or criminal" indicate methods of conducting business
before a court. The judge not only concluded that an FTC proceeding was not
within the meaning of section 5, but further that appellate review standing
alone cannot toll the statute "because it was not instituted by the United States,
but rather by this defendant." 34
On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, attorneys for the plaintiff offered the
proposition that the broader language, "any civil or criminal proceeding," sub-
stituted for "any suit or proceeding in equity or criminal prosecution" by the
1955 amendment, included an agency action. They noted that Congress, while
knowing of the American Bar Association's request for specific exclusion of
FTC hearings, refrained from excluding such proceedings, even though it did
provide that judgments or decrees entered in actions where the United States
sues in the same capacity as a private party for injury to its property caused
by anything forbidden by the antitrust laws could not be used as prima facie
evidence. The only other explicit exception to section 5 is that to subsection
(a), denying the use of "consent judgments or decrees entered before any testi-
mony has been taken" as prima facie evidence. Hence, "[u]nder the maxim, Ex-
pressio unius est exclusio alterius, it should be concluded that Congress intended to
exclude only these two classes of judgments or decrees."3 5 Although the argu-
ment smacks of sophistry, the Court in Volasco Products, faced with the same
contention, gave the reasoning some dignity by basing its decision solely on a
rebuttal.
The language has been streamlined, but an examination of [the
1955 Amendment] clearly shows that it was only an amendment to
section 5 of the Clayton Act and that it made no reference to the
Federal Trade Commission Act. The Brunswick case was reversed
on the one point, because of the Court's revised conclusion that
section 5 applied only to the Clayton Act. There is nothing in the
Amendment of 1955 which would point to a different conclusion. 6
The court has not only replied too simply, but has also overlooked the
1959 amendment and misconstrued the revised conclusion of Brunswick. The
better answer was offered by the attorneys for Reynolds Metals: it cannot be
assumed that, simply because the American Bar Association expressed the fear
that the proposed language might create uncertainty concerning the status of
an FTC order, Congress "formed a purpose to make a change in the law, and
relied on the 'uncertain' language to achieve the change."3 " The court in
Farmington Dowel said: "It seems reasonable to assume that if Congress had
intended by the substitution of the words 'civil or criminal proceeding' in the
33 221 F. Supp. 15, 17 (E.D. Mo. 1963).
34 Ibid.
35 Appellant's Reply Brief, p. 13, Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 327
F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1964).
36 223 F. Supp. 712, 713 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
37 Brief for Appellee, p. 52, Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 327 F.2d
725 (8th Cir. 1964).
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1955 amendment of the Clayton Act to include a Federal Trade Commission
proceeding, it would have amended the phrase 'judgment or decree' to include
an administrative 'order.' "" It is further asserted that the phrase "suit or pro-
ceeding in equity" was replaced by "civil proceeding" simply to conform to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which abolished the law-equity distinction.
However, in 1923, Proper expressed "grave doubt whether the proceedings
before the Commission is a proceeding in equity."39 With the Finality Act now
at hand, Chief Judge Biggs of the Third Circuit drove hard at what he deemed
a weak point.
Certainly, when the Justice Department seeks an injunction against
a defendant for violation of the Clayton Act, its purpose is to pre-
vent irreparable injury to the public weal by the traditional equitable
remedy. . . . The effect of the FTC proceeding is essentially the
same, by virtue of the 1959 amendment to Section 11.... Formerly
the FTC had to seek the enforcement of its order - after its de-
termination of a Clayton Act violation, and a subsequent violation
of the order... - by a petition to the Court of Appeals; but now
enforcement decrees by the Circuit Court of Appeals are unnecessary
and the orders become final and self-executing by the expiration
of defendant's time to seek review.40
Perhaps it would be well to explore the judicial, or quasi-judicial, frame-
work of the Federal Trade Commission. First, the FTC operates under an
internal separation of functions: the investigators and prosecutors do not sit
as judges; the adjudicative function is served by hearing officers at the initial
decision level and by a board of Commissioners upon agency review. Under
its Rules of Practice for Adjudicative Proceedings, a complaint must issue'
after which the defendant has 30 days to answer. 2 Further, there is the oppor-
tunity to discover the names of witnesses to be called and the nonprivileged
documents to be used in the case.43 Counsel supporting the complaint has the
burden of proof,4" and each party "shall have the right of due notice, cross
examination, presentation of evidence, objection, motion, argument, and all
other rights essential to a fair hearing."45
Probably the most significant point of comparison between agency adjudi-
cation and a judicial proceeding is that of admissibility of evidence. The objec-
tion often raised is that evidentiary rules are greatly relaxed in administrative
adjudication. Section 4.12(b) of the Commission's Rules of Practice provides
simply: "Relevant, material, and reliable evidence shall be admitted. Irrelevant,
immaterial, unreliable, and unduly repetitious evidence shall be excluded. Im-
material or irrelevant parts of an admissible document shall be segregated and
excluded so far as practicable." 4 But in a nonjury antitrust case, Judge Wyzan-
38 223 F. Supp. 967, 973 (D. Me. 1963).
39 295 Fed. 729, 732 (E.D.N.Y. 1923).
40 New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minziesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 332 F.2d 346, 354-55
(3d Cir. 1964). (Emphasis added).
41 Federal Trade Commission Rules of Practice for Adjudicative Proceedings, 16 C.F.R.§ 3.4 (1964).
42 Id. at § 3.5.
43 Id. at §§ 3.8(a)(6) and 3.11.
44 Id. at § 3.14(a).
45 Id. at § 3.16(b).
46 Id. at § 3.14(6).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
ski, an authority in the antitrust field, allowed administrative practices to in-
fluence judicial methods. He reasoned that in a civil suit in which the Govern-
ment can secure against a defendant an injunction and order without monetary
damages, the trial judge is not required to exclude every type of hearsay evi-
dence which would otherwise be excluded. "It is difficult to imagine any satis-
factory ground for deciding that evidence which is admissible before the Federal
Trade Commission is inadmissible before a judge sitting without a jury in a
civil anti-trust case brought by the Government.""7 Professor Davis further
observes that the entire legal system is witnessing a trend "toward replacing
evidence rules with discretion, admitting all relevant and useful evidence, and
basing findings on evidence on which responsible persons rely in serious affairs." '
In a word, the FTC has adopted a posture very closely resembling judicial
activity, especially in a nonjury civil antitrust suit.
The facile answer remains, however, that "by definition, a proceeding
which is analogous to a suit or proceeding in equity is not a suit or proceeding
in equity."4 Yet, the Commission, in dealing with monopolistic practices, is
recognized to possess an expertise which the courts do not have."' Furthermore,
the FTC is the primary enforcer of the antimerger provisions of the Clayton
Act's section 7 and "to hold that such a proceeding was not within Section 5(b)
would thwart in part the Congressional scheme for the enforcement of section
7."51 Finally, "[t]here is no difference between the substantive anti-trust law
applied by the Commission and that applied by the Court." 2
THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF SUBSECTIONS 5(a) AND 5(b)
The question before the court in Proper was whether a Commission order
is admissible as prima facie evidence in a subsequent treble-damage suit. None
of the recent cases has directly faced this issue; rather they have had before
them the question of whether an FTC proceeding tolls the statute of limitations.
Nevertheless, the argument is made that "proceedings which cannot yield
judgments and decrees applicable as prima facie evidence under Section 5(a)
cannot toll the statute of limitations under Section 5 (b).," Assuming arguendo
that a contested final FTC order cannot constitute prima facie evidence of anti-
trust misdeeds, it is proposed that the two subsections must be construed in pari
materia. Historically, they were always but two paragraphs within the same
section and only recently were formally separated into subsections (a) and (b).
More significant is the contention that the sole purpose of the tolling provi-
sion is to give a treble-damage claimant adequate opportunity to invoke a "judg-
ment or decree." For example, whether or not a Justice Department criminal
47 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 349, 356 (D. Mass. 1950).
48 2 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 14.17 (1958).
49 Brief for Appellee, p. 17. See Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 327
F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1964).
50 See FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 726 (1947).
51 New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 332 F.2d 346, 354 (3d
Cir. 1964).
52 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 349, 356 (D. Mass. 1950).
53 New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 332 F.2d 346, 357 (3d
Cir. 1964).
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prosecution results in acceptance of a nolo contendere plea or an acquittal, there
was at its inception the possibility of a conviction which could have been used
as prima facie evidence. The same is true of a consent judgment to a Depart-
ment proceeding. While such judgments cannot constitute prima facie evidence
under 5(a), there is the possibility, at the time the action is instituted, that it
will result in a judgment which can be used under 5(a). Since the decision
to toll the statute must be viewed from the moment the proceeding is initiated,
the statute should be suspended whenever it is possible that the resulting judg-
ment might be one that a private plaintiff could introduce as prima facie evidence.
This reasoning is not applicable to a proceeding whose resulting order could
not possibly be utilized by a private litigant.
The only answer is that the statute does not have as its sole purpose the
aiding of treble-damage suitors by providing prima facie evidence of antitrust
violations. A recognized complementary purpose is the encouragement of capitu-
lation to government demands through the exclusion, from the operation of
section 5(a), of consent decrees entered before any testimony has been taken.5"
Thus, the argument proceeds that, even conceding that the ideal result of tolling
would be to preserve the benefits of subsection (a), it does not necessarily follow
that without such benefits, or their possibility, subsection (b) is inoperative.
Despite the fact that a consent judgment is entered, there are nonetheless
some benefits which the private plaintiff may reap from the prior government
action. Certainly the Government does not maintain open files for one seeking
treble damages, but the legal process of its proceeding can uncover much which
points the way for the subsequent plaintiff. This was apparently recognized by
Congress in 1955 when it suspended the statute of limitations for an additional
year beyond the conclusion of the Government's case.
Although the statute is tolled during the pendency of the proceed-
ings brought by the United States, the plaintiff in a treble-damage
action may find himself hard pressed to reap the benefits of the
Government suit if, upon its conclusion, he has but a short time
remaining to study the Government's case, estimate his own damages,
assess the strength and validity of his suit, and prepare and file his
complaint. To alleviate such difficulties, the present bill would
extend the tolling period not only for the duration of the Govern-
ment's antitrust suit, but for I year thereafter. 55
More tangible, however, was the benefit which the court in Olympic Re-
fining Co. v. Carter"8 recently permitted a private party. The Ninth Circuit
ruled that information obtained by the Justice Department from defendants
to a prior antitrust suit, which terminated in a consent decree, was discoverable
by a plaintiff in subsequent private litigation. "[N]either in the express nor
implied terms of the statutes or rules is there any indication that a consenting
defendant could gain the additional benefit of holding under seal, or stricture
of nondisclosure, for an indefinite time, information which would otherwise
be available... to other litigants who had need of it."' In N. J. Wood, Chief
54 Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 366, 371 (D. Minn. 1939).
55 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2332 (1955). (Emphasis added).
56 332 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1964).
57 Id. at 265.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Judge Biggs attempted to remove the necessity of the above reasoning with the
dictum that a final order by the FTC is admissible under section 5(a):
Judgments and decrees in government suits are only prima facie
evidence of antitrust violations. The defendant still has his "day
in Court" on that issue.... He is entitled to offer rebuttal evidence
to break down the force and effect of that prima facie evidence.
. . . 3M argues that FTC orders cannot be admitted because of
the more liberal evidentiary rules of the administrative agency. This
plus the broader administrative process might place the FTC pro-
ceeding on a somewhat unequal footing with a similar judicial
proceeding brought by the Department of Justice.... The differ-
ences at most are peripheral and any attack along those lines would
go to the weight of the prima facie evidence, not to its propriety.
The use of administrative orders as prima facie evidence in private
suits is not new to our law. Under the Interstate Commerce Act,
49 U.S.C. § 16(13), a reparation order of the ICC is admissible
as prima fade evidence in an action for damages by a shipper
against a defendant railroad, found by the ICC to have exacted
unreasonable rates.58
But Judge Wyzanski had taken a contrary position in 1950:
The Commission's cease and desist order may in many cases
be as drastic as the decree of a District Court, except for the one
point that the District Court's decree unlike the Commission's
order can be used as prima facie evidence in a treble damage
suit.59
Those who seek to place an FTC order within the ambit of section 5, however,
reply that the 1955 and 1959 amendments undercut the basis of this stand.
But those amendments do not equate the United States with the Federal
Trade Commission.
BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES
Advocates of exclusion maintain that the Commission is an entity distinct
from the United States, "capable of suing and being sued in its own right.
The United States and an agency may appear as separate parties in a suit and
present opposing views.""
It is interesting that Farmington Dowel explicitly refused to rule on this
point.6 But recall that the District Court in Highland Supply concluded that
even the judicial blessing of a Commission order would not qualify it under 5 (b),
because the appeal was instituted by the defendant and not by the United States.
The plaintiff offered this answer to the higher court: "While it is true that the
appeal from the Federal Trade Commission order was taken by [defendant], the
decree of enforcement was hardly sought by the [defendant] in the Court of
Appeals, but rather, by the Commission.
6 2
58 New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 332 F.2d 346, 358
(3d Cir. 1964). (Citations omitted.)
59 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 349, 356 (D. Mass. 1950).
60 Brief for Appellee, p. 69, Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 327 F.2d
725 (8th Cir. 1964). (Citations omitted.)
61 223 F. Supp. 967, 973 n.ll (D. Me. 1963).
62 Brief for Appellant, p. 17, Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 327
F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1964).
AN ANTITRUST ARGUMENT
N. J. Wood finds some indication that the agency acts on behalf of the
United States in the 1950 amendment to section 11 of the Clayton Act, which
gives the Attorney General the right to intervene in the FTC's proceedings.
But "on behalf of the United States" is not enough to satisfy section 5 (b) which
limits itself to proceedings "instituted by the United States." Those who argued
against an in pari materia construction earlier may desire to change their posi-
tion. Judge Biggs, however, provides an answer: "Any argument that an FTC
proceeding is not a suit by the United States must meet the reality that whether
the Commission functions under the Clayton or FTC Act, it does so in the
public interest and as an administrative arm of the Government.""3
CONCLUSION
The arguments are well matched. Perhaps, if anything is dear, it is that
heavy reliance in subsequent cases upon the precedent of Proper v. John Bene
& Sons- allowed the court in N. 1. Wood to offer a strong opinion to the con-
trary by a thorough discussion of the various statutory changes which had taken
place since the Proper decision of 1923. Only Reynolds Metals' brief on appeal
produced an independent argument able to meet squarely the Third Circuit's
challenge.
Where the balance is struck may depend ultimately upon how the judiciary
appraises the quasi-judicial function of the FTC. But the decision cannot be
made on the worth or weakness of this agency alone, since section 11 permits
the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Communications Commission,
the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Federal Reserve Board, where antitrust
transgressions arise in the areas under their special jurisdiction, to also enforce
sections 2, 3, 7 and 8 of the Clayton Act. To allow an FTC order to constitute
prima facie evidence and/or to toll the statute of limitations means that soon
an order of one of its sister agencies may also be considered within the scope of
section 5. These five agencies of the "headless fourth branch of government" '"
must each be evaluated in their particular area of specialization.
Further, to hold that an FTC order is within 5 (b) makes it easier to find
that a controverted agency command is also within 5 (a). Therefore, any argu-
ment against in pari materia construction is but a technical screen of the real
issue. If one is a step to the other, certainly the interrelationship of the two sub-
sections is of the utmost importance. Perhaps it can be stated summarily that
whether an FTC order constitutes prima facie evidence of an antitrust violation
or not, the defendant still has his day in court. The order is obviously not con-
clusive evidence, and the private plaintiff that relies entirely upon the determina-
tion of a Government case, failing to produce independent evidence, is not
likely to find his pockets filled with treble damages.
The Third Circuit has either opened a Pandora's Box or made a significant
contribution to antitrust law; the answer eventually must be given by the Supreme
Court.
63 New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining. & Mfg. Co., 332 F.2d 346, 353
(3d Cir" 1964).
64 Time, July 31, 1964, p. 57.
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For the moment, however, the reasoning of District Judge Augelli is com-
ping:
It certainly would seem not to have been the Congressional
intent to have plaintiff's rights turn on the fortuitous circumstances
of which agency initiated the action. To permit a plaintiff to take
advantage of facts uncovered as a result of a Department of Justice
proceeding, but not as a result of a Federal Trade Commission
proceeding brought under the same statute, does not seem logical.65
65 New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 216 F. Supp. 507,
510 (D. N.J. 1963).
